



DE CURAÇAOSCHE COURANT.

Deel XVI.

ZATURDAG den 16ten FEBRUARY, 1828.

N. 7

Gedrukt en Zaturdag's morgens uitgegeven ten Drukkery Kantore voor Zyne Majesteit den Koning der Nederlanden, door De Weduwe WILLIAM LEE.

In naam des Konings.

WY JOHANNES VANDEN BOSCH,
Generaal Major, Ridder der 3de Klasse van de Militaire WillemsOrde, Commissaris Generaal voor de Nederlandsche West-Indische bezittingen.

Allen die deze zullen zien en hooren lezen, salut! doen te weten:

Overwegende dat het Zýner Majesteit goedgunstig heeft behaagd te hepaten, dat eene kapitale som van viermaal honderd duizend guldens in deze kolonie zal worden in omloop gebragt, zoo tot het aanmoedigen en begunstigen van den handel, als tot het vermeerderen van het thans circulerend kapitaal; overwegende dat Zýne Majesteit tot het bereiken van dit doel, bevolen heeft het oprigten eener Bank, welke op de nader te bepalen wyze, de genoemde som van f400,000 in bankbiljetten zal in omloop brengen, met dien verstande nochtans, dat de houder van zoodanige bankbiljetten dezelve, des verkiezende, zonder de minste korting of oponthoud, tegen gouden of zilveren specien, by de Bank, zal moeten kunnen verwisselen;

Hebben besloten gelyk wy besloiten by deze:

Over het Kapitaal der Bank.

Art. 1.

Het primitief fonds der Bank zal bestaan uit viermaal honderd duizend Guldens (f400,000.) aan bankbiljetten; boven en behalve de hierna te bepalen som in specie.

Art. 2.

Alle uitgaven der bank, het zý tot het beleenen van koopwaren, vaste goederen, of tot het escompteren van wissels, zullen of in penningen of in bankbiljetten geschieden.

Art. 3.

De bankbiljetten zullen tegen hunne volle nominale waarde, by alle ryks kantoren en publieke administratie te Curaçao in betaling worden aangenomen voor de verschuldigde belastingen en betalingen van allerlei aard, als mede voor de wissels die door het Koloniaal Gouvernement, op dat van het Moederland worden afgegeven.

Art. 4.

De houders en vertoonders der bankbiljetten worden als de wettige bezitters en eigenaars daarvan beschouwd, en de betaling zal mitsdien aan hun niet geweigerd mogen worden. Het zal echter aan de Directie vrystaan, wanneer er verdenking bestaat of wanneer zý daartoe door de houders van vermiste of gestolen bankbiljetten schriftelyk is aangezocht, het quitteren en afteekenen van het ter verwisseling aangeboden biljet van hem die het geld daarvoor ontvangt te vorderen.

Art. 5.

De bankbiljetten zullen dagelyks van 9 tot 12 men, zon en feestdagen uitgezonderd, by de Directie der Bank, zonder oponthoud of eenige korting, tegen zilveren of andere in deze kolonie wettig gangbaar verstaande munt of geld specien, verwisseld kunnen worden.

Art. 6.

Tot waarborg van de houders der bankbiljetten wordt bepaaldelyk verbonden:

1. Eene som van twee maal honderd duizend Guldens f200,000 in gereede penningen, welke in het reserve fonds der bank gestort zal worden.

2. Alle panden en voorwerpen door de bank beleend.

3. Zoodaagig gedeelte uit de inkomsten

van de Gouvernements kas op het eiland, als vereischt wordt, om, ten allen tyde, de volle waarde der bankbiljetten aan de bezitters te kunnen voldoen, terwyl bovendien die waarde, door den Gouverneur Generaal der West-Indische bezittingen, op autorisatie van Zýne Majesteit den Koning, wordt geguarandeerd.

Art. 7.

Allen die zich zouden mogen verstouten om de actien van de bank, bankbiljetten, recepissen, renversalen, onderteekeningen, stempels, zegels, byzonder papier of wat dies meer is natemaken, te vervalschen ofte veranderen, daarvan iets uitte-wisschen, afte doen, bytevoegen, of op eenigerlei wyze te altereren, of wel behulpzaam te zyn aan zoodanige contrefactien, vervalschingen, byvoegingen of alteratien, gelyk mede, allen die zoodanige nagemaakte, vervalschte of gealtereerde bankbiljetten, recepissen, renversalen en zoo voorts opzettelyk mogten uitgeven, verspreiden of in omloop brengen, zullen, onverminderd hunne verpligting tot vergoeding van alle kosten, schaden en interessen, de straf incurren, welke op het vervaardigen van valsche munt is gesteld, of zoodanige andere straffen, als by de wet nader zullen worden bepaald.

Art. 8.

Wanneer het ter bevordering van den handel en de welvaart van Curaçao wenschelyk of raadzaam wordt geacht, om het primitief fonds der Bank, in bankbiljetten te vergrooten, blyft zulks aan Z. M. den Koning voorbehouden. De vergrooting van dit fonds zal echter geen plaats hebben, zonder dat gelyktydig op nieuw eene som in gereed geld in de Bank gestort of ter dispositie van de Directie gesteld wordt, welke som in evenredigheid der nominale waarde van de vermeerderde bankbiljetten, niet geringer zal zyn, dan die voor het eerste fonds bepaald, alles onder gelyken waarborg en guarantie.

Operatien der Bank.

Art 9.

De operatien der Bank zullen aanvankelyk bestaan in het beleenen der koopmanschappen in zoodanige bewaarplaats of plaatsen als daartoe door de Directie zal of zullen worden aangewezen op te slaan, en verder kunnen worden uitgebreid.

1. Tot het beleenen van vaste onbezwaarde eigendommen, Goud en Zilver van erkensbare waarde.

2. Tot het escompteren van wisselbrieven, mits ten minste voorzien zynde van twee behoorlyke endossementen van als solvabel bekend staande kooplieden of handeldshuizen.

3. Tot het ontvangen van gelden van het Gouvernement in rekening Courant en tot het betalen in bankbiljetten van assignatien of quitantien door hetzelfde op de Bank afgegeven.

Art. 10.

Om de handeldryvende ingezetenen voor de nadeelen te hoeden welke voor hen zouden kunnen ontstaan, by aldien door de Bank, eenige koophandel werd gedreven, als mede om voortekomen alle opkoopingen of monopolien, waartoe de Bank wellicht in de gelegenheid zou zyn, wordt by deze uitdrukkelyk vastgesteld, dat de Directie derzelve niet zal vermogen te koop, inruilen of bekomen, eenige waren, koopmanschappen, of goederen, hoe ook, genaamd; noch eenige effecten of crediten ten laste van den staat van buitenlandsche moegedbeden of van byzondere ingezete-

nen; dat wyders dezelve directie in hare qualiteit niet zal vermogen eenig aandeel te hebben of wel direct of indirect deel te nemen in eenige buiten of binnenlandsche handel, bedryven, compagnieschappen van schepen, assurantien, visscherijen, fabrieken, trafyken, landbouw of anderzins, hoe ook genaamd, en eiodelyk niet zal mogen bezitten of koopen eenige vaste goederen, zonder uitzondering van welken aard ook.

Art 11.

Kooplieden, inwoners en burgers van Curaçao bekend staande ter goeder naam en faam zullen zich de bestendige beschikking over een bepaald kapitaal by de Bank, onder de navolgende voorwaarden kunnen verzekeren.

a: Dat zy eene som gelykstaande aan een achtste gedeelte van het kapitaal waarover hun de beschikking wordt toegestaan, deponeren in de Bank of wel in plaatse daarvan eene waarde daarvoor verbinden, het zy in vast onbezwaard eigendom, hypotheekbrieven of ongemunt goud of zilver, gelykstaande aan het zesde gedeelte daarvan, en bovendien betalen eene rente a vyf ten honderd 's jaars van het besproken kapitaal, integaan met den dag waarop hun hetzelfde is toegestaan.

b: Dat de gedeeltelyke of geheele uitbetaling der som, naar hunne verkiezing zal plaats hebben, by het geven van toereikend onderpand, het zy in vast onbezwaard eigendom, hypotheekbrieven, drooge of natte koopwaren; zullende zy op de drie eerste, twee derde der waarde bekomen en op de laatste, de helft van de waarde, terwyl de effecten en goederen zullen moeten opleveren eenen toereikenden waarborg voor het daarop te schieden kapitaal, de waarde naar billykheid gewaardeerd zynde ten genoeye van den Directeur der Bank.

c: Dat de bedoelde effecten en drooge waren niet langer dan voor zes maanden, en de natte waren niet langer dan voor drie maanden tot onderpand zullen kunnen verstrekken, en de daarop geschotene kapitalen moeten worden afgelost, ten ware de Directeuren der Bank daartoe aangezocht, mogten goedvinden de beleening te verlengen, hetwelk echter nimmer zal mogen geschieden, ten zy het blyke dat het geleende kapitaal werkelyk in den handel wordt gebezigd en de daarvoor verbonden objecten eene voldoende zekerheid opleveren, almede ter beslissing van den Directeur der Bank.

d: Dat by een gedeeltelyken uitslag der waren, eene geevenredigde som, die echter niet minder zal mogen zyn dan van vyftig gulden, door den belanghebbende moet worden afgelost, of wel andere goederen ter gelyke waarde als de uitgeslagene gedeponereerd, onder dezelfde restrictien als hiervoren sub: c: vermeld.

e: Dat elk die op de voorgeschreven wyze een kapitaal besproken heeft, gerechtigd is het genot daarvan, elken dag op te zeggen tegen betaling der rente, tot en met den dag toe waarop de opzegging geschiedt, terwyl als dan dadelyk zullen worden gerestitueerd de koopgoederen, het kapitaal, of de hypotheken tot gedeeltelyken waarborg van rente en mogelyke verliezen aan de Bank verstrekt.

Art. 12.

De vaste goederen en hypotheekbrieven by de Bank verbonden, zullen niet mogen bezwaard zyn met Huwelyksche voorwaarden noch legaal judiciair of Conventioneel zyn verbonden.

FROM ENGLISH PAPERS.

LONDON, Nov. 24.

REFLECTIONS ON THE LATE OCCURRENCES IN THE EAST.

The political events are the expression of the systems adopted by the individuals who are at the head of public affairs. In order to discover their springs, a deep, searching, and impartial inquiry is requisite. The late occurrences in the East are of such a nature as to require particular attention; we shall therefore endeavour to fathom their nature, causes, and effects.

For the last six years Europe has made great efforts to avoid a war with Turkey, and even a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey had been brought about, when suddenly an English admiral, under pretence of interposing in favour of a nation respecting whom his government had, up to the present moment, displayed the greatest indifference, does suddenly, without previous declaration of war, and after an armistice, attack and destroy the naval forces of Turkey. What can we reasonably infer from so severe and unexpected proceeding? That the late events in the East have been prepared and accomplished by the policy of England—that she alone will derive advantage from them—that of the two Powers who assisted her, Russia, perhaps, may gain some portion of a province; but that France will for a certainty derive no benefit from her co-operation, but that, on the contrary, she will risk to compromise her commercial intercourse with Egypt. For the purpose of supporting this assertion by facts, we must enter into some development.

During the life-time of the Emperor Alexander, the affairs of the East remained stationary. The pacific character of that Prince would not allow him to settle his differences with Turkey, because a rigid discussion of the existing grievances would infallibly have disturbed the peace of the world. On the one hand, he would not reconcile himself with the Porte without obtaining from her the concessions he had originally exacted, and a refusal of which would have compromised the dignity of his Crown; on the other hand, he dared not break with the Ottoman Power, because he knew perfectly well that such a rupture would have given dissatisfaction to the Cabinets of Europe, who, in that case, would have thrown obstacles in his way.

But scarcely was the grave closed upon him, when, notwithstanding the disturbances which had broken out in Russia, when, on the Emperor Nicholas, ascending the throne, Wellington attempted quickly at Petersburg, and Stratford Canning at Constantinople, to reconcile Russia with the Porte, they shackled the former power by the treaty of Ackermann, and made her renounce the great advantages which she might have derived from her own strength and resources, as well as from the state of exhaustion of Turkey.

Humanity, however did not gain any thing by this political transaction, Christian blood continued to flow in Greece, but the sufferings of Greece made little impression on the British Cabinet. It had attained its object, which consisted in disarming the arm of Russia, ever raised against the Porte, and in enabling the latter to defend herself against her powerful neighbour. Every thing shows that England came to the assistance of the Sultan, in order to rid him of the Janissaries, who formed an obstacle to the growth of the military power of the Turks. After the regeneration of the Ottoman empire was once completed, England became easy on that score, and turned her eyes on the Mediterranean. The Egyptian squadrons which ruled in that quarter, gave her umbrage. Her jealousy with respect to Egypt being, moreover, excited for a length of time on account of the preference which the Pacha had manifested for the French to the prejudice of the English, when Mehemet Ali could never forgive for their attack upon Alexandria in 1806.

It may be easily conceived that the Greeks, after being despoitively abandoned by the Russians, must have been disposed to throw themselves into the arms of the first power that offered to extricate them

from the danger into which their struggle with the Turks had precipitated them.—Such a situation could not escape a policy so penetrating and so eager of dominion as the policy of England. To destroy the combined fleet of the Turks and Egyptians—to compromise the commercial interests of France in every part of the Levant—to effect the moral conquests of the Morea, and to form it into a species of colony under the protection of England—these were the triple advantages which Great Britain conquered at a single blow, by the treaty of the 6th of July, and its consequences.

We cannot sufficiently dwell on the adroitness which England displayed in preparing and carrying into effect the objects she meditated. In the first place, however, Admiral Codrington took special care not to oppose the departure of the Egyptian squadron; on the contrary, he left them perfectly at liberty to join the Turkish ships that happened to be in the port of Navarino. After their junction was effected, the English Admiral had further the address of prevailing on the French and Russian squadrons to assist him in completing the destruction of that fleet. There was, no doubt, much skill in thus availing himself of his rivals for the purpose of annihilating, in its cradle, a maritime power which commenced to give uneasiness to a power so jealous as England; but it is likewise remarkable, that both the French and the Russians should consent to spill their blood profusely, to second the English in such an enterprise. In the same proportion as Turkey was a counterpoise to Russia, on account of her military power, would her Navy have been obstacles to the encroachments of England in the Mediterranean, where the latter is already so powerful.—But Great Britain, who raises embankments to stop the growth of other Powers, overturns all those which might counteract her own projects of invasion. Besides, she must be well satisfied of the passive endurance of the European Cabinets before she undertook what she accomplished without difficulty.

Up to this time we clearly perceive the object of the British Cabinet had in view, when drawing up the Treaty of the 6th of July; but we cannot yet encompass the advantage which France and Russia will derive from this treaty, and above all, from the battle of Navarino. Its known effects, as far as France is concerned, appear from the telegraphic despatch transmitted from France to Marseilles, for the purpose of suspending the commercial operations in the Levant and on the coast of Barbary. France expects with anxiety intelligence from the East, to learn the measures that may have been taken with respect to the French subjects established at Smyrna, Alexandria, and Constantinople.

To compensate all these disadvantages, we have the eulogies bestowed by Admiral Codrington and the English newspaper on the undeniable courage of our gallant seamen, and on the skill of our officers.

These are for the present the consequences of the bloody engagement of Navarino, an engagement which has been compared to the Battle of Lepanto, but which may with more propriety be assimilated to the burning of Copenhagen. It remains in the mean time for us to examine these consequences in their two-fold relation to the independence of the Greeks, and to the integrity of the territory of the Turkish empire.

The first of these effects, the independence of Greece, acquires from the defeat of the Turks a greater degree of probability, unless the question becomes more complicated in consequence of unforeseen events that may be brought about by the crisis in which the affairs of the East are now involved.

With respect to the preservation of the Turkish empire as an European Power, notwithstanding the violence of the blow that has been inflicted upon it, it may be affirmed that Europe has not been changed in her disposition towards that Power. The Note presented to the Reis Effendi on the 1st of September last confirms this. That note assured the Porte, that at all events she might rely upon the friendly dispositions of the Powers with respect to herself. Admiral Codrington sent, immediately af-

ter the naval action, a Turkish Officer, who had fallen into his hands, to announce to Ibrahim Pacha and to the other Turkish Commanders, that they ought to forget the past—that the Powers of Europe considered the Grand Seignor as their friend. The protracted stay of the Ambassadors at Constantinople—their tone of security, whilst the European Admirals burnt the Turkish Egyptian fleet—prove that the Cabinets of Europe are still unanimously agreed upon the preservation of the Turkish empire.

However, nothing can be affirmed in this respect. Supposing even that the Grand Seignor were perfectly resigned to the late events, and in fullest submission to the will of the Christian Powers, it is clear that, unless each of the Powers subscribing to the Treaty of the 6th of July be absolutely disinterested, more or less weighty differences may arise. The occupation, for instance, of one single port by England, might determine Russia to pass the Pruth, and might thus occasion a more or or less considerable dismemberment. At all events, France will not profit by such dismemberment; for she will think herself well off if her commercial intercourse with Egypt and other parts of the Levant be not thereby injured.

DECEMBER 4.

We understand that despatches have been received by our Government from Constantinople to the 10th of November. An embargo had been laid upon all descriptions of property belonging to the subjects of the three Allied Powers; but the Ministers had not then left Constantinople. We have reason to believe that the above may be relied upon, although an Evening Paper, formerly in the confidence of Ministers, positively asserts that Government have not received despatches later than the 6th of November. Though the Ambassadors had not left at the time abovementioned, yet it is generally believed that they did leave between the 11th and 13th of November.

Frankfort, Nov. 27.—We fear that the present state of things at Constantinople may, in the end, lead to hostilities, and that Austria may be thereby obliged to assemble a large army. This has caused the prices of corn to rise in this neighbourhood, and also in Saxony and Wurttemberg.

Brazilian War.—The following is an estimate of the maritime losses suffered by the Brazilians, since the commencement of their war with the La Platans:—Brazil has lost 31 vessels of war, and 233 merchantmen, without counting the prizes made by the privateers armed in the United States. The Republic has lost 3 vessels of war, 3 gun-boats, 1 privateer, and 3 or 4 sloops laden with wood,

Extract of a letter from a Gentleman, in George-town (Miss.) to the Editors of the *Commercial Advertiser*, dated Sept 21, 1827:—"You desire to know the state of feeling in this State relative to the Presidential question, and it is with pleasure that I inform you that Mr. Adams is doubtless gaining friends very fast here. Although there has hitherto been a majority in this State for Jackson, yet the supporters of Mr. Adams have ever been respectable for their numbers, firmness and wealth, and embodying three-fourths of the talents and abilities of the State, on his side. On the other hand, the friends of Gen. Jackson are those who followed his fortunes in the war with the Greeks and at New Orleans, and becoming dazzled with military fame for a time made him the "god of their idolatry." Time and reflection, with the unexpectable course pursued by the administration, are rapidly dissipating that meretricious halo which encircled the brows of the Orleans hero, and they begin to view him as he really is, a daring military leader, but without the talents requisite to guide the helm of government. Besides, he is indirectly, if not directly, identified in the systematic persecution which is carrying on against Mr. Clay, and through him against Mr. Adams. The correspondence which has taken place on that subject, has had a great effect in opening the eyes of the people relative to the ambitious views and unwarranted conduct of Mr. J.—"